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SOCIAL RELATIONS AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS * 
by Hideshi ITOH" 
I Introduction 
A finn is a human organization. The employer makes implicit or explicit employment 
contracts with workers. Based on the earlier work by Coase (1937) and Simon (1951), recent 
economic literature considers the employment relation as one of the most fundamental 
constituents of the finn, and analyzes various aspects of that relationship extensively. (See Hart 
and Holmstrom (1987) for a survey of agency theory and labor contracts, Williamson (1975, 
1985) for transaction cost economics, and Kreps (1990) for an example of other theories of the 
firm.) 
Given employment contracts and other aspects of formal organization structures, however, 
workers are engaged in various 'kinds of direct interpersonal activities with co-workers. Some 
actions are directly productive: workers may provide various kinds of help for co-workers, or 
they may behave uncooperatively each other to reduce co-workers' productivity. There exist 
psychologically oriented interactions as well: workers may spend resources to reduce co-workers' 
disutility on jobs, for example, by showing respects, cheering them up, listening to their 
complaints, and so on. Such "social" relationship among workers has long been an important 
subject of sociologists studying organizations since the Human Relations School (Roethlisberger 
and Dickson, 1939; Mayo, 1945).') Recently, sociologists Baron (1988) and Granovetter 
(1985) review economic literature on organizations critically to point out its under-emphasis on 
social relations. 
In this paper, we introduce a simple model of the relationship between a finn and workers 
which incorporates some aspects of nonproductive social relations among workers mentioned 
above, and examine their implications on work incentives and wage contracts. 2) The model is a 
variant of standard agency models with moral hazard (which Arrow (1985) renamed hidden 
* This is a revised version of section 4 of an unpublished paper entitled "Worker Collusion and 
Organization Design: Effects of Interpersonal Interaction," December 1988. Much of the research 
was conducted while the author was visiting Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific 
Studies at University of California, San Diego. 
** Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
1) See also standard textbooks such as Perrow (1986) and Scott (1987) for other references, 
evaluations, and criticism. 
2) Interactions through production externalities such as "helping" or "sabotage" are analyzed in Drago 
and Turnbull (1988), Itoh (1991), and Lazear (1989). 
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action): Workers take unobservable actions given wage contracts, while they possess no 
precontractual private infonnation. More specifically, consider the following standard setting of 
the relationship between a risk neutral principal (a firm) and risk averse agents (workers). The 
firm assigns each worker to a well-defined job and selects a wage scheme to him. Given his 
contract with the firm, each worker exerts a level of effort. The outcome of his job depends on 
his effort and some noise tenn. Noise tenns are assumed to he independent across jobs. 
Outcomes are publicly observable while the level of effort chosen is not, so that wage schedule 
for each worker can depend only on outcomes. Because of no externality of effort and the 
assumption of stochastic independence across jobs, relative performance evaluation does not give 
a reason for the wage scheme for a worker to depend on outcomes of other workers' jobs. (See, 
for example, Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984).) Suppose that the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function of a worker is additively separable to utility on income and disutility 
of effort: workers are assumed to be effort averse. 
We introduce into this standard model nonproductive interpersonal activities which we call 
socialization. Each worker chooses, besides his effort, a level of socialization, which is publicly 
unobservable. For example, this level can be interpreted as the length of time spent for 
socializing with his co-workers. A worker's level of socialization with another worker enters 
into only the disutility terms of both workers, and thereby affects the productivity of neither 
worker. An increase in a worker's socialization reduces a level of disutility of his co-worker, 
while it increases the former worker's disutility for sufficiently high levels 0/ socialization. 
However, for small levels of socialization, a worker may be indifferent in his socialization level or 
may derive some "social pleasure" from socializing so that his disutility may be decreasing in his 
socialization level. (We call such a worker a socializing type.) We show that when workers 
reach a Nash equilibrium of effort and socialization, the equilibrium levels of socialization are 
infficient : they under--socialize in equilibrium. Since this proposition is not associated with the 
risk attitude of workers at all, it implies that whether or not workers are risk neutral, the firm 
cannot attain the first-best solution (which is the solution under perfect information) when 
nonproductive interpersonal activities exist. This contrasts with standard agency models in 
which the first-best solution is attained when agents are risk neutral. 
Note that the existence of such externalities does not alter the optimality of independent 
contracts: Since socialization does not affect the probability distribution of the outcome of either 
job, the optimal wage scheme for a worker is still contingent on the outcome of his job only. 
Interdependent wages merely impose additional risks on workers. 
As a control devise for workers' socializing activities, we consider a policy called isolation. 
We assume that the firm can enforce zero socialization with no additional costs. Separating 
workers physically is one obvious way of implementing this policy. Even in the situation where 
workers work together or they share the same work floor or room, it is relatively easy to find 
whether workers socialize or not (provided that their job!\ do not require productivity--enhancing 
discussion as in our model). We show that if workers have no social pleasure, isolation is never 
preferred by the firm, under the assumption that the relation between each worker's effort and 
socialization received involves complementarity: the higher socialization he receives from his co-
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worker, the smaller his marginal disutility of effort is. Stimulating social relations among 
workers is thus profitable to the finn because of the incentive effect that the cost of inducing 
them to work hard is reduced, as long as workers are not of socializing type. 
We then present two cases where the firm prefers isolation, both of which contain the 
condition that workers, when exerting appropriate work intensity, have little incentive to social-
ize. Then the fmn prefers isolation if either there is a worker of socializing type (who has social 
preasure) or each woker selects his socialization contingent on the observation of his co-
worker's effort level. The reason is that without the control of socializing activities, it is more 
costly to induce workers to work appropriately. Each worker, when he shirks, has an incentive 
to increase his socialization under no control, which reduces his own disutility of effort further 
when he has social pleasure. Similarly, in the case of mutually observable effort, each worker 
receives higher socialization by shirking, so that his disutility decreases more under no control 
than under isolation. An observed practice of supervising workers closely to prevent them from 
chatting in busy working hours is indeed better from the incentive points of view than no such 
control. 
Much of the recent literature on principaVmultiple agents relationships focuses on the 
collusion problem associated with the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium (Demski and Sappington, 
1984; Ma, 1988; Ma, Moore and Turnbull, 1989; Mookherjee, 1984; Mookherjee and 
Reichelstein, 1990). The same problem arises in our model exactly because of the existence of 
socializing activities. Given the optimal contracts, there may exist another equilibrium that both 
workers prefer to the one the firm wants to implement. When workers' effort is mutually 
unobservable before socializing, this problem does not arise as long as they have no social 
pleasure. We show, however, that workers of socializing type will fmd a Pareto superior 
equilibrium in which both -shirk, if the effect of receiving more socialization from co-workers is 
sufficiently low. When effort levels are mutually observable and workers' socializing activities 
are contingent on the observation of effort, the problem turns out to be more serious: We always 
fmd another (Pareto superior) equilibrium in which at least one of the workers shirks. These 
problems under no control of socializing activities may lead the finn to the adoption of isolation 
beyond the restrictive conditions given above. 
We also discuss collusive choice of socialization by workers. (See Tirole (1986, 1988) for 
related discussion.) When workers select their socialization levels to maximize their total welfare, 
they usually engage in higher levels of socialization than when they behave noncooperatively. 
However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the firm prefers workers to collude 
than not. The reason is that the net effect of such collusive choice of socialization on incentive 
compatibility constraints is ambiguous: each worker enjoyably receives higher socialization while 
his socialization level is too high from the fiim's points of view. This implies, however, that if 
workers are risk neutral, collusion in socializing activities enables the principal to attain the first-
best outcome by paying the whole marginal benefits to them. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and presents 
the under-socialization result. Section 3 examines the incentive effects of socialization and 
obtains results concerning the comparison between isolation and no control of socializing 
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activities. Section 4 focuses on collusion problems. Section 5 summarizes the results. 
II The Model of "Human Relations" through Socialization 
In this section, we present the simple model of the relationship between a firm and two 
workers with nonproductive interpersonal activities. Extensions to the case of more than two 
workers are straightforward. The model is based on standard agency models with moral hazard, 
in particular, the formulation by Grossman and Hart (1983) and its extension to multi-agent 
situations by Mookberjee (1984), 
The firm has two jobs and two workers indexed by n= 1,2, and assigns worker n to job n. 
Worker n selects an effort level an from a compact set of feasible effort levels. Effort an is 
expended only on his job n. The output x n from job n depends on worker n's effort an and a 
noise tenn through some production function. To focus on nonproductive interactions between 
workers, we assume that there is no production externality such as "helping" or "sabotage." In 
addition, we assume for simplicity that the noise terms are stochastically independent. Suppose 
that x" takes one of the M" possible values xt < ... < XMn. For each outcome iEI"= {l, ... , 
MJ, let P;"(a,J be the probability of x"=x/" induced by the production function and the 
probability distribution of the noise tenn. 
Worker n also selects a level of socialization s" from a compact set S". Socialization does 
not affect the probability distribution on outcomes of jobs, while it comes into workers' utility 
functions. We aSsume that worker n has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an 
additively separable form, denoted by Vn(w)-G"(a", s" I sJ, where w is the wage paid to him, 
and ki=-nY Workers are assumed to prefer higher wages and to be (weakly) risk averse: V" is 
strictly increasing and concave. The main feature of the model is that workers' utility is affected 
by their socializing activities. We will later introduce several assumptions on Gn• 
The firm behaves as a Stackelberg leader to select a wage schedule for each worker. 
Workers then select effort and socialization levels simultaneously. We assume that both effort 
and socialization levels are publicly unobservable while realized outputs from each job are 
publicly observable. Wage schedules hence generally depend on the outcomes of two jobs. 
However. since there is no production externality and outputs are stochastically independent 
across jobs, we can restrict our attention to independent wage schemes; each worker is paid 
contingent on the outcome of his job only. The existence of nonproductive interpersonal 
activities does not alter the well-known result in the literature of relative performance evaluation 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Mookherjee, 1984). That is, given wage schedules which induce workers to 
select some effort levels and pay each worker depending on the outcomes of both jobs, the firm 
can find new wage schedules which are independent, implement the same effort levels, and 
improve risk sharing. Let w;" be the wage paid to worker n when x"=x;", and let U"(w", • ) be 
the expected utility of worker n, given his wage scheme w"=(wniEI". It is given as 
3 ) Whenever k and n appear together, assume k=l= n. 
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U'(w', aw s, I Su = ~ P,'(aJ V'(w,"l - G'(aw s, I SU. 
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral: The objective of the firm 1S to find wage schedules which 
maximize the expected net profits. Let Bij be the benefits from output pair (x/, xf) and Bea,. 
a,) = L.;L.jPi(al)P/(aJBlj be the expected benefits. B, is assumed to be strictly increasing in i 
and j. Then the expected net pro~ts of the firm are given by 
B(al, a,) - (~ pi (al) wi + :;:; P/(a,) wi). 
Grossman and Hart (1983) introduced a useful decomposition of the firm's optimization 
problem as follows: First fix an effort pair (a" aJ, and find wage schedules which implement 
it with least costs. This problem is called the implementation problem for (01, ~). The solution 
to this problem yields the optimal expected payments to workers for each effort pair. Once the 
implementation problem is solved for each (a). az), the remaining problem is to find the effort 
pair which maximizes the finn's expected benefits minus the optimal expected wage payments. 
In this paper. we also employ the Grossman-Hart decomposition. Different from effort 
levels, however, the finn cannot directly control socialization levels through designing wage 
schemes contingent on outcomes: Th finn selects wage schedules only to implement a particular 
effort pair, taking into consideration the effects of workers' interaction through socialization on 
their choice of effort. The current paper focuses on how the finn can affect workers' choice of 
socialization levels in order to reduce the cost of implementing a particular effort pair. We 
hence assume for simplicity that each worker has two feasible effort levels hand 1 where h 
represents a "high" level of effort or "working hard," and 1 represents a "low" level or "being~ 
lazy." We assume that for each n, the expected benefits under (h, h) are sufficiently higher 
than those under the other combinations of effort. Thus, it is sufficient to examine the firm's 
implementation problem for (h, h) in subsequent analysisY 
Before presenting the fonnal definition of the finn's problem, we introduce several notations 
and assumptions. First, we adopt the following standard assumptions on P/'(h) and Pt(!). The 
first assumption is the stochastic dominance condition: higher effort leads to higher output in 
the sense of the first---order stochastic dominance. The second assumption is the no moving sup~ 
port condition. 
AsSUMPTION O. For each n, (i) L./~I P,'(h)'; L./.I Pt(!) for all jEI, with strict inequality for 
somej; and (ii) Pt(a) >O/or each i and a=h, 1. 
For simplicity, we assume Sn to be a scalar and let the set of feasible socialization levels Sn be 
an interval [0, sJ with sn>O: We nonnalize the minimum feasible socialization level to zero, 
representing "no socializing at all." A natural interpretation might be that Sn is the length of 
time worker n spends for socializing with his co-worker. However, since we do not assume that 
4) Extension to more than two feasible effort levels does not alter the results of the paper if the 
concern of the firm is to prevent workers from shirking "downward," that is, reducing their effort. 
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the socialization level chosen by a worker must be equal to that chosen by the other worker, it is 
more appropriate to regard SrI as the "intensity" with which worker n socializes. Let G:(s". sJ = 
G"(h, s" I sJ and G/'(8" , s,) = G"(t, s" I sJ. Since workers are effort averse, we have the 
following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION J. For each n. G." (s" sJ > G," (s" sJ for all (s" sJ. 
We next assume that each worker's disutility of effort decreases at a decreasing rate as a 
level of socialization from his co-worker increases. Each worker prefers receiving higher 
socialization from his co-worker, ceteris paribus. 
ASSUMPTION 2. For each nand SIIJ Gh"(s". sJ and G/'(8", sJ are strictly decreasing and convex in 
s .. 
Are workers unwilling to increase socialization for co-workers? I believe that this is true 
for sufficiently high levels of socialization. For low levels of socialization, however, a worker's 
increasing his socialization level may not raise his disutility: He may be indifferent in his 
socialization level or he may be of socializing type, deriving some "social pleasure" from reducing 
his co-worker's disutility. Thus, we state the following two assumptions separately: the 
assumption of no social pleasure that the disutility of a worker is nondecreasing in his 
socialization; and the assumption of social pleasure that an increase in a worker's socialization 
level reduces his disutility of effort at a decreasing rate for small socialization levels. The results 
in this section, however, hold under either assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 3a. (Worker n has no social pleasure.) For each s/(> G,,1I(sn. s';; and Gt(sn, s';; are 
nondecreasing in S1l' 
ASSUMPTION 3b. (Worker n has social pleasure.) mere exist s EO (0. 'J. Sk EO Sb and a EO {I. h) 
such that G:(sn, sJ is strictly decreasing and convex in Sn E(O, s). 
Whether or not social pleasure exists, we assume that for sufficiently high levels of socializa~ 
tion, workers dislike giving more socialization to co-workers. In addition, we assume that the 
disutility increases at an increasing rate for such socialization levels. 
AsSUMPTION 4. For each nand s/(> there exist i and i' in (0, sJ such that Gf: (sn, s,;; is strictly 
increasing and strictly convex in 8n> sand GtCsn. sJ is strictly increasing and strictly convex in sn 
>SH. 
We draw typical graphs of the disutility function without and with social pleasure in Figures 
la and lb, respectively. 
We next assume that both G"n and Gt are continuously differentiable in their arguments and 
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a;(sJ=max{sES" I sEargminG;(i, sJl 
at(sJ =max{sES" I sEargminGt(i, sJl , 
These functions are well defined and continuous. The definition implies that a:(sJ is worker n 
's best response to socialization Sk from his co-worker when the former worker's effort level is a 
= h. 1. When several values are possible, we assume that a worker chooses the highest level of 
socialization that minimizes the disutility of the other worker over the set of the best responses. 
Let sai,(a, b=h. () be worker n's Nash equilibrium socialization defined by s:b=a;Cst;y when his 
effort level is a and his co-worker ICs level is h. For simplicity, we assume that Sanb is unique and 
strictly positive for each (a, b). 
Let v/,= V"Cw/I), Following Grossman and Hart, we regard Vin rather than wt as the finn's 
choice variables. Also let r/> n be the inverse function of VII and un be worker n's reservation 
utility level. Then the firm's (implementation) problem (FP) is formally stated as follows. 
(FP) 
min I; pi(h)¢ l(vi) + I; ~2(h)¢ 2(V/) 
.' .• ' I J 
subject to, for each n= 1, 2, 
(Nrc) 
(pc) 
The fum selects wage schedules (v', v2) to minimize its expected payments under the two 
constraints. The first one is the Nash incentive compatibility constraint: Given worker k's choice 
of effort and socialization levels (h, s{;J. worker n has no incentive to deviate from (h, Sh"J. 
The second constraint, called the participation constraint, states that the expected utility of each 
worker must be at least as high as his reservation level. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under the assumptions stated above, the equilibrium socialization levels are 
inefficient. 
To see this, note that Gh" is smooth and convex in its arguments. Thus, at the equilibrium 
(s" ~) = (s~h> S;h)' the partial derivative of G: with regard to s~ is zero. The marginal increase 
from S~h hence does not raise worker l's disutility while it strictly decreases his co-worker's 
disutility of work. This is true for worker 2 as well. Workers therefore could have achieved 
lower disutility levels by simultaneously increasing their socialization levels. 5) This under-
socialization is likely to be costly to the finn as well. If workers' disutility levels were lower, the 
expected payments in utility units which implement a given effort pair would also be lower. 
In particular, this implies that the first-best solution (which is the solution when the finn 
5 ) The other equilibrium socialization levels SM, st;,. s/i are also inefficient. 
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can monitor each agent's choice of effort and socialization levels perfectly) cannot be achieved 
even when workers are risk neutral. This is in contrast with the standard models of principal-
agent relationships without precontractual private information, in which the principal can attain 
the first-best outcome by paying the whole marginal benefits to each agent. 
The first-best solution is defined as follows. Suppose that effort and socialization levels are 
publicly observable, and define for a= h, I, 
Then the firm can implement (h, SJII=I,2 by paying the fixed wage C;B(h, Sn' sJ to worker n if 
workers choose the specific effort and socialization levels, and by paying a sufficiently small 
wage otherwise.6) Let (8,*, ~*) be the first-best socialization. Since we have assumed that (h, 
h) is the first-best effort, 
(h, 8"*)"=",<= argmax B(a" a,)-C;"(a" 8" S,)-CJ;B(a" s" 8,), 
", . ..,.',." 
In particular, the first-best social transfers (SI*' Sz. *) solve 
When workers are risk neutral, this is equivalent to minimizing a weighted sum of G~ and Gf, 
which yields a Pareto efficient socialization pair. Thus, by Proposition 1, paying the whole 
marginal benefits to each worker does not resolve the incentive problem: inefficient socialization 
activities make the implementation of high effort more costly than the first-best costs. In 
particular, if workers have symmetric preferences, then the solution s* =SI* =s/ minimizes Gh(s, 
s) = Gl(s, s) = Gf(s, s), so that we have s* >Shh for n= 1,2: The first-best socialization level of 
each worker is higher than the equilibrium level. 
III Incentive Effects of Isolating Workers 
One might think that the under-socialization result in the previous section would motivate 
the firm to control workers' socializing activities through some instruments such that they 
increase their socialization levels. The problem is not so obvious, however, since we have not yet 
examined the effect of socialization on workers' incentives to exert effort, to which we turn in 
this section. In fact, we show that there are cases in which the firm prefers forcing workers not 
to socialize at all. We call such a policy isolation. 
The term isolation represents the supposition that zero socialization can be enforced without 
costs by isolating worker physically. In reality, such a separation is very often costly or 
infeasible. However, the policy can be interpreted in a different way. We assume that the finn 
can find, with no additional costs, whether workers have chosen zero socialization or not (but 
6) Some additional assumptions are generally required to ensure that the fIrm can implement (h, 
sn) ~= I, 2 by the payment which guarantees workers exactly their reservation utility levels. See 
Grossman and Hart(1983). 
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cannot observe the precise level when socialization has occurred). This is a plausible assumption 
as long as workers' jobs do not require discussion : When workers work in the same work floor 
or room, supervisors can force workers not to talk during working hours relatively easily. Then 
isolation means that the fmn enforces workers not to socialize by imposing heavy penalties on 
them if they chose to socialize. 
Since both constraints (NrC) and (PC) in the fIrm's problem hold with equality at the 
optimum, the optimal solution (vt) satisfies the following two equations for each worker n : 
(I) 
(2) 
Note that the right-hand side of equation (1) is strictly positive by Assumption 1. By 
Assumption 0, the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (NIC) is strictly positive, and hence the 
smaller the right-hand side is, the smaller the optimal value of the firm's expected payments to 
workers is. Socialization between workers has important effects on this incentive compatibility 
constraint. 
To examine the effects of socialization on effort incentives, we introduce assumptions on 
workers' "marginal disutility" of effort Gt- Gt. We first assume complementarity between 
effort and socialization received: each worker is less effort averse when he receives more 
socialization from his co--worker. In other words, the harder he works, the larger the favorable 
effect of socialization from his co--worker. 
ASSUMPTION 5. For each nand s. jf s> s. G,(s", s) - Gt(s" , s) < G,(s" , s) - Gt (s" , s). 
Then we can show our first result concerning the comparison of isolation with the policy of 
no control (on socializing activities). Isolation enforces zero socialization, so that the optimal 
contract under isolation satisfies (1) and (2) with all the arguments of G"n and Gt replaced by 
zero. 
PROPOSITION 2. If Assumption 3a (no social pleasure) holds for both workers, then the firm never 
prefers isolation to no control on socializing activities. 
PROOF, We show tbat the right-hand sides of (I) and (2) are smaller than those under zero 
socialization. For (2), by Assumption 2 and the definition of sth> we have G"n(o, 0) > G"n(o, s,,~) 
~Gh(Sth' s"rJ. Concerning (1), 
G,(O, 0) - Gt(O, 0) > G,(O, stJ - Gt(O, stJ = Gh"(s,,, S!.,) - Gt(at(stJ, stJ 
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 5, and the equality is by Assumption 3a. 
The logic is very simple. When workers are forced not to socialize at all, their disutility 
levels of working hard are higher, so that the finn must compensate more. In addition, deviation 
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from high effort to low effort is easier, and hence more risk must be imposed on workers under 
isolation than under no control. The assumption of no social pleasure plays a role in this second 
argument. Since equilibrium socialization is positive, each worker receives a higher socialization 
level under no control on socializing activities, which fact has a favorable effect. However, there 
is another effect of increasing his socialization level on his Own disutility of effort. Under the 
assumption of no social pleasure, this second effect disappears since his disutility is constant 
when his own socialization level increases up to the best response to a given level of socialization 
received from his co-worker. 
Is" there a situation where isolation is favorable to the finn? To examine this question, we 
introduce two more assumptions on each worker's disutility of effort, which characterize the 
workers' best responses. We assume that a worker is more unwilling to increase socialization the 
harder he works, or the lower his co-worker's socialization level is. These assumptions seem to 
be quite reasonable. 
ASSUMPTION 6. For each n, Sh and s>f. G,'(s, S0-Gt(S, s0'2G;:(f. s0-GtCf. S0. The 
inequality is strict over the range where Gh"( •• S0 is strictly increasing or Gt( •• S0 is strictly 
decreasing. 
ASSUMPTION 7. For each n and a, Ga"(s", s~) - G;(8". 10?::. G;(s" , sJ - G;(8". S0 holds if s">8,, 
and Sk> 1", 
LEMMA I. (0 Assumption 6 implies that for each nand s, a;:(s) ~at(s); (i0 Assumption 7 
implies that for each n, both af/(s) and arCs) are nondecreasing in s. 
PROOF, (0 Suppose instead a;:(s) >a,'(s). Then Assumption 6 implies that G;:(a;:(s) , s) - G: 
(at(s), s) '2 Gt(a:(s) , s) - Gt(at(s), s) holds. The left-hand side is nonpositive by the 
definition of af:. On the other hand, the right-hand side is strictly positive since Gt(s", s) must 
be strictly increasing for s,,>aNs) by the dermition of at A contradiction. OJ) Let s>1 and 
suppose af/(s) <a:(1). Then by Assumption 7, we have G:(ah"(1), 1) - G:(a:(s), 1)?::. Gh"(a: 
(1). s) - G:(a:(s), s). The left-hand side is nonpositive by the definition of ah". On the other 
hand, the right-hand side is strictly positive since Gf/(s". s) must be strictly increasing for s,,>ah" 
(s). A contradiction. The same argument holds for at. 
This lemma shows that under no control on socialization, each worker increases his 
socialization when he works less hard or when his co-worker provides more socialization. Based 
on this property, the next lemma provides some partial order of equilibrium levels of socializa-
tion : a worker's equilibrium socialization is higher the less hard he or his co-worker works. 
PROOF: This lemma is a special case of more general results by de Groote (1988) and Lippman 
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et al. (1987). The proof here follows de Groote. We compare two equilibria (s" sJ ~ (s, •• stJ 
and (.lOll' ... J = (sM, s/f) here. The other comparisons proceed similarly. We consider the 
following fictitious, iterated choice of socialization. When worker k decreases his effort from h 
to [, given worker n's socialization st", worker k chooses s~=aNs:J ~at(Shnh) =Shkh by Lemma 1 
(0. Then, given sl, worker n chooses s;=a::(sD?:.a::(stJ=Sh~ by Lemma 1 (ii), Worker k 
then chooses sl=aNsD ?:'af(st,,) =81. By continuing this process, we obtain nondecreasing 
sequences 8h"h::;:S;::;:S; ••• and sh~::;:sl::;:sf .... Since the feasible sets of socialization are compact, 
these sequences converge to (SIl' S0 in S" X S", which is (shl. siD by the continuity of the best 
responses. Thus, 811",,:::;; s/l. and Sh~:::;; Sl~' Finally, sli < sn follows from Assumption 4. 
Let us examine whether there is a case in which isolation has better incentive effects on 
effort choice. We have seen in the proof of Proposition 2 and the discussion following it that the 
negative incentive effect of isolation results from the fact that workers do not receive positive 
socialization from co-workers. Now suppose that worker 2, when working hard, has little 
incentive to socialize, that is, sth is close to zero (e. g. because he is a junior, inexperienced 
worker). On the other hand, suppose that worker 1 is an experienced senior worker of 
socializing type (with social pleasure) and he has incentives to select socialization greater than 
zero even though he receives little socialization from worker 2. Then by Assumption 6 we can 
find sth sufficiently small to satisfy the following inequality: 
GI(o, O)-G/(O. 0) < GI(sl •• sfJ-G/(sl •• sfJ. 
Then by the definition of a/. we have 
GICO. 0) - G/(O. 0) < GI (sl •• sf,) - G/(u/(sf.). sfJ. 
that is, to induce worker 1 to work hard, the firm must impose more risk on him under no 
control than under isolation. 
Of course, this argument does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the firm prefers 
isolation to no control under the condition above. First, since worker 1 selects a higher level of 
soci~lization in equilibrium, enforcing zero socialization will increase the expected payments (in 
utility units) to worker 1. Second, and more importantly, under isolation, worker 2 no longer 
receives socialization from worker I, so that inducing worker 2 to work hard is more costly when 
worker 1 is forced to select zero socialization than when he selects the equilibrium socialization 
level. Whether isolation is better or not is determined by the net effect. 
If both workers' equilibrium socialization levels are sufficiently close to zero, these costs of 
isolation will become negligible. More precisely, suppose that for each n, 
(3) 
that is, when a worker receives no socialization and when he works hard, he also has no 
incentive to socialize. We then assume that the equilibrium socialization levels S1h and Sth are 
sufficiently close to zero so that for each nand aE {h, n. 
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(4) means that the difference in disutility of each effort level between isolation and the 
equilibrium socialization is negligible. On the other hand, suppose that for each n, 
arCs) >a,(s) for all s. (5) 
(We will later present an example satisfying these conditions.) This and (3) imply that when a 
worker is shirking, he chooses to socialize even if he receives little socialization from his co-
worker. Under these conditions, we present two cases in which the finn strictly prefers isolation 
to no control On socializing activities; the case where a worker has social pleasure, and the case 
where workers' effort choice is mutually observable before they select socialization. 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that conditions (3), (4), and (5) hold for each n and a E {h, I}. 
Then if at least one worker has social pleasure (Assumption 3b). then the firm prefers enforcing 
both workers to choose zero socialization. 
PROOF: Since (4) holds for a= h, each worker's expected utility on income is approximately 
equal between under isolation and under equilibrium socialization. Concerning incentive com-
patibility, supposing that worker n has social pleasure, we have 
where the last inequality holds because of (5) and Assumption 3b. (6) implies that worker n's 
unilateral deviation from h to I is now less easy under isolation. Thus, isolation is better when 
both workers have social pleasure. When only one worker, say worker 1, has social pleasure, 
worker 2's marginal disutility is approximately equal in the following three cases; when zero 
socialization is enforced to worker 1 only, to both workers, and to neither worker. Isolation is 
hence preferred by the fInn. 
When a worker is of socializing type, increasing socialization from zero strictly reduces his 
own disutility of effort as well as his co-worker's. And since sh"h<a/n(s:J. this effect is generally 
more signifIcant when he is lazy than when he works hard. Thus, when workers selecting high 
effort have little incentive to socialize, isolation is better to the fIrm since without it, the fIrm 
would have to impose more risk on the worker to prevent him shirking. 
To illustrate the result above, consider the following example. Suppose that workers have an 
identical form of disutility of effort given by the following quadratic functions: For s, tES= [0, 
l], 
G.Cs, t)~~ 17.(1-/)'-~ S(t+7,,) + ~ s'; 
G/s, t) ~ ~ 17,(I - ,) '- ; S(t+7,) + ~ S2. 
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(We drop the superscripts distinguishing workers.) We assume eh>e/>o and O<rh<rl< 1. 
Then these disutility functions satisfy Assumptions stated above. In particular. workers derive 
social pleasure for low levels of socialization. (Assumption 3b is adopted.) The best response 
functions are calculated as a,(t) = +(t+r,) and a/t) = +(t+r,). These functions provide the 
equilibrium socialization as follows: Shh=rh; sl/=r,; Shl= +(2rh+r~; and Slh= +(2;/+7;). 
We consider the limiting case of r,=O. Then clearly (3), (4), and (5) are satisfied. The 
marginal disutility of effort in (1) is then calculated as 
G,(Shh, s,,) - G/a,(s,,) , Shh) = ; (II, -II,) (l-r,) '+ ~ (r,+ 3r,) (r,-r') 
_I( ) 12 
-2 11,-11, +8",. 
which is clearly larger than G,(O, O)-G,(O, 0)= +(11,-11,). That is, as in Proposition 3, the 
firm strictly prefers isolation to no control. The advantage of isolation solely comes from the 
fact that 71 is positive, that is, workers have incentives to increase socialization when they shirk. 
The finn's strict preference for isolation in the result above depends on the existence of 
social pleasure. However, if we modify workers' choice of effort and socialization, then we can 
show the similar result for workers with no social pleasure. Consider the following modification. 
Each worker selects his effort level simultaneously, and then, after observing the other worker's 
effort, selects socialization simultaneously. When workers share the same work floor or they 
work together. it is often the case that each worker observes how hard his co-workers work and 
so his decision of socialization depends on such observations. Then the marginal disutility of 
effort in the incentive compatibility constraint changes to G;: (Shh' sA) -G/Cs~, Sh~). which is 
larger than the right-hand side of (0: The effort choice of a worker can affect his co-worker's 
choice of socialization such that his deviation fonn h to I results in the increase of socialization 
he receives. 
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that (3), (4), and (5) hold for each nand aE (h, l}. If each worker 
selects his effort level and observes his co-worker's effort before the choice of socialization, then the 
firm prefers isolation to no control on socialization. 
PROOF; By following the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that (5) implies Shh < Shl and siJ, < s~ 
for n= 1, 2. This in turn implies G/,(s, s/fJ < G/,(s, stu for each s. We hence have 
That is, the firm has to impose more risk on workers to induce them to choose h under no 
control than under isolation. Since the expected payments to workers are approximately equal by 
(4) for a= h, the finn strictly prefers isolation. 
As the proof shows, this result does not depend on whether or not there is a worker of 
socializing type. When a worker deviates from high effort to low effort, his co-worker, 
observing the deviation, increases socialization, which strictly reduces the fanner worker's 
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disutility of effort. Thus. without controlling workers' socializing activities, providing incentives 
to work hard costs more to the firm. 
The condition in Proposition 3 or 4 can be interpreted from the perspective of statistical 
inference. In the limit of Shh=Q for each n, the firm's coarse monitoring of whether socialization 
is zero or positive perfectly detects their effort 1evels: Under workers' equilibrium behavior, the 
finn will observe nonnegligible socializing activities only when workers shirk. Then the finn's 
dichotomous monitoring yields information for workers' effort which are not already in 
outcomes, so that the optimal wage schemes should impose penalties on them contingent on the 
observation of positive socialization. However, the optimal wage scheme for each worker must 
be also contingent on his outcome though it is a coarser signal of his effort level than the 
dichotomous signal of socialization: since socialization is a choice variable of workers, they can 
shirk while selecting zero socialization. 
In the example of the quadratic disutility functions above, the marginal disutility of effort 
under the assumption of mutually observable effort is given as 
This is strictly larger than GhCO, 0) - G/O, 0). The difference increases as 81 or 71 increases. 
These effects result from the fact that each worker receives higher socialization when he shirks. 
In the situation where a factory or an office to which workers belong is in busy time, it is 
often the case that the firm supervises workers closely so that they do not chat. Our results 
suggest that such a policy in fact has better effects on workers' incentives to work hard than no 
control on their interpersonal relationships. provided that their effort is mutually observable and 
they select socializing activities contingent on such observation. On the other hand, it is rare to 
observe such isolation in many research institutes including universities. The main reason is, of 
course, that interactions among members in those institutions provide them with important 
opportunities to exchange information, ask questions, and so on, which improve their 
productivity. Besides such production externalities, however, interpersonal interactions are 
beneficial in mitigating incen~ive problems, as long as members work relatively independently and 
they are not of socializing type. 
IV Worker Collusion 
There are two potential problems concerning workers' action choice in our model of the 
firm-worker relationship. "The first one comes from the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium: Given 
wage schemes, there may exist another Nash equilibrium preferred by both workers to the one 
the firm wants to implement. The s"econd problem is that the workers may engage in side 
contracting to play cooperatively rather than noncooperatively. These problems seem more 
relevant in our model because socialization bears opportunities for workers to discuss the 
possibility of collusive behavior. We consider each of these problems in the following two 
subsections. 
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A. The Multiple Equilibrium Problem 
Under no control on socializing activities, the firm in our model designs wage schemes so as 
to implement the effort pair (h, h) and the corresponding socialization (S~h' s;;J as a Nash 
equilibrium with minimum costs. However, it is easy to show that, given the solution to the 
firm's problem, each of the other effort pairs and the corresponding socialization levels provides 
both workers with higher expected utilities than the one the firm wants to implement does. For 
example, consider the case in which both workers select low effort. Assuming strict inequality s/; 
> Sh"h for each n, we have, by (1) and Assumption 2, 
~ P/'(h)v/"-Gh~(Shh' Sh~)=~ P/'(!)v,,"-G/(a/CshkJ. ShkJ<L:. P/'(!)v,"-G/(s/l, Sf:) 
Iii
where (v;") is the optimal solution to the fmn's problem (FP). Similarly, both workers obtain 
strictly higher expected utilities in the case where one of them selects low effort and the other 
selects high effort, provided that the inequalities in Lemma 2 are strict. Thus, if (I. {J or (h, {J 
is another Nash equilibrium effort pair in the game following the finn's choice of the optimal 
wage schemes for (h. h), workers will select that equilibrium undesirable to the finn. 
Fortunately, when workers have no social pleasure, the effort combinations other than (h, 
h) cannot fonn Nash equilibria, and hence no problem arises. 
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose (5) for each n. If Assumption 3a (no social pleasure) holds for n= I, 
2, then (h. h) is the only equilibrium effort pair under the optimal wage schedules. 
PROOF: We show that (T, l) is not an equilibrium effort pair. That is, we must show 
~ P/'(f)v/,-Gt(s/;, s/7)<~ P/'(h)v/,-Gh"(oh"(s/7), s/7) 
for some n, where (v;"l is the optimal wage scheme satisfying (I) and (2). By (I). this 
inequality is equivalent to 
Gh"(Shh, sf;:; - G/"earest;:;. st;:; > G: (a;(sI1), SID - GtCs//, Sl~). 
By Assumption 3a and 5, we have 
Gh"(Sh"h. sf;:; - Great (stJ , Sth) = Gh"(S;h' Sh~) - Gr(Sh~h' Sth) 
> Gh"(Shh' sl7)-Gr(SM" s17) 
= G: (a;(sI7) , s17) -Gt(s//, sI7). 
Similarly, we can show that (h, f) is not an equilibrium effort pair since the worker who selects 
I prefers deviating to h. 
The intuition is that under a f) or (h, D, each worker receives a higher socialization level 
than under (h, h). Thus, by the assumptions of no social pleasure and complementarity between 
effort and socialization received, the marginal disutility of effort is reduced. This makes 
deviation from h to I more difficult and deviation from I to h easier, so that those who select I 
have incentives to deviate. 
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If at least one of the workers has social pleasure, however, (1, 1) or (h, l) may be an 
equilibrium effort pair because the worker of socializing type, say worker n, reduces own 
disutility of choosing I by selecting higher socialization than 8th' FOI example, (I, !) becomes an 
equilibrium effort pair if and only if both workers have social pleasure and 
(8) 
for each n. This implies that when worker n selects as his socialization rus best response to 
worker ~s socialization, the higher socialization worker n receives, the higher his marginal 
disutility of effort is. Thus, his deviation from 1 to h under (1, 1) is more difficult than 
deviation from h to 1 under (h, h), so that CZ, {J forms another equilibrium. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for Cl. l) not to be an equilibrium. effort pair is that 
the reverse (strict) inequality of (8) holds for some n. In other words, a worker's degree of 
effort aversion is affected sufficiently more by socialization he receives (via Assumption 5) than 
by his own socialization (via Assumption 6). 7) In the example in the previous section, Cl. f) is 
not an equilibrium effort pair if and only if 
(j (j TI-Th 
h- I> 2[(I-r0 + (I -TUJ . 
The left-hand side represents the magnitude of the effect of higher socialization received (via 
Assumption 5) while rl-rh represents the magnitude of the effect of higher socialization selected 
(via Assumption 6). The larger the former effect or the smaller the latter is, the less likely CZ, {J 
is to be an equilibrium effort pair. 
The problem is more serious when each worker selects his socialization contingent upon his 
observation of the other worker's effort. Under the optimal contracts for (h, h), both workers 
enjoy higher expected utilities by choosing (I, {) or (h, l). S) In addition, we can show that at 
least one of CZ, I) and (h, {J is always an (subgame perfect) equilibrium effort pair. 
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that (5) holds for each n and that each worker selects his socialization 
after obsening his co-worker's effort level. Then under the optimal wage schemes for (h, h), there 
always exists another (Pareto superior) equilibrium where at least one worker selects low effort. 
PROOF: The condition for (1, l) not to be an equilibrium effort pair is, for some n, 
7) A similar condition is sufficient for (h, f) not to be an equilibrium effort pair. However, it is not 
necessary: A worker who selects h under (h, f) has incentives to deviate to l if a higher level of his 
socialization has suffiCiently large effects on his effort aversion than the socialization he receives has. 
In fact, we can show that in the example in the last section, (h. () is never an eqUilibrium effort 
pair because either of the conditions above is always satisfied for each n. 
8) When workers select (h, 1) and the corresponding socialization levels, the one who exerts low effort 
obtains the same expected utility level as his level under (h, h). 
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where CV/I) is the optimal contract for (h, h), Since (v/I) satisfies (1) with Gp-(aPCshk;;J. ShkJ 
replaced by Gt(s/L itt;), the condition is rewritten as 
(9) 
On the other hand, under (h, I), the worker who selects 1 has no incentive to deviate since his 
deviation to h does not alter his expected utility level. Thus, the condition for (h, f) nqt to be 
an equilibrium effort pair is that each worker, when selecting h under (h, I). has an incentive to 
deviate to 1. that is, for each n, 
(10) 
Conditions (9) for some nand (10) for each n cannot be satisfied at once. and thereby at least 
one of O. I) and (h. I) must be always an equilibrium effort pair. 
Note that in our model these problems arise exactly because of socializing activities between 
workers. Without them (as in isolation), each worker's choice of effort is a single-person 
decision problem, and the optimal contracts for (h, h) make each worker indifferent between 
two effort levels: Workers have no incentive to choose effort different from the one the finn 
prefers. This observation suggests another potential advantage of isolation. In Propositions 3 
and 4, we provided cases in which isolation is preferred to no control by the finn. Both 
assertions contain the restrictive condition that workers have little incentive to socialize when 
they work hard. The firm might want to implement isolation, however, even if this condition is 
not satisfied, in order to prevent workers from colluding to select undesirable effort levels. 9) 
B. Collusive Choice of Socialization 
Our analysis of employment relationships so far has been conducted under the assumption 
that each worker behaves in a self-interested way in his choice of effort and socialization. In 
some situations, however, workers may behave as a group to maximize their total welfare. For 
example, their long-tenn relationship may provide them with opportunities to reciprocate ac-
tions. In this subsection, we address the following question: If the firm can induce workers to 
collude in their socializing activities (through some personnel policies other than wage contracts), 
does it prefer to do so? 
We only focus on the reciprocity of socialization between workers for two reasons. First of 
all, collusion on workers' effort introduces a new issue of the tradeoff between incentive effects 
and risk sharing. (See Itoh (1990) for the analysis of this issue.) Since the analysis of this 
problem is beyond the scope of the current paper, here I only consider collusion on socializing 
activities. Second, reciprocity is in fact more likely to occur for interpersonal activities such as 
9 ) If the firm can enlarge the strategy sets of workers and design multi-stage mechanisms of 
communication with them, it will be able to implement the desirable effort pair and socialization as 
a unique sequential equilibrium as Ma (1988) demonstrated in the standard agency model with 
moral hazard. 
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socialization in our model than for each worker's effort into his own job. 
For simplicity, we assume that workers have identical utility functions. Hereafter we drop 
the superscripts representing workers from utility functions and equilibrium socialization. Sup-
pose that workers first select effort simultaneously. and then, after observing effort levels, select 
socialization to maximize the sum of their expected utilities. Let S<l~ be a worker's collusive 
socialization level when his effort is a and his co-worker's is b. Then 
(s,:, s":)=.rgmin G,(s, , s,)+G,(s" s,). 
31." 
We assume the uniqueness of each sat. Since effort levels are chosen in a noncooperative way. 




Since Gh(s"j;, Sht) < Gh(Shh, ShJ. both workers in fact prefer colluding in socialization, and the 
finn pays smaller expected payments in utility units. Thus, if the marginal disutility of effort in 
(I 1) is smaller than that under no collusion, then we can conclude that the firm prefers worker 
collusion. However, this is not necessarily true. Smaller disutility and smaller marginal disutility 
have no logical connection here. 
Under collusion. each worker receives higher socialization from his co-worker than under 
no collusion, which fact has the better incentive effect. However, each worker selects his 
socialization higher than the best response, and this results in substantial increases in his own 
marginal disutility. The firm prefers collusion if the fonner effect dominates the latter. 
Note that there is one situation in which worker collusion is in fact preferred by the finn ; 
the case where workers are risk neutral. Under the assumption of identical utility functions, the 
collusive socialization level given (h, h) is exactly the first-best socia1ization level. Thus, by 
paying each worker the whole marginal benefits from his job, the firm can attain the first-best 
outcome. 
V Concluding Remarks 
Social relations among workers have been emphasized by sociologists studying organizations 
for a long time while economists so far have not paid much attention to them. This paper 
presented one way of analyzing them by incorporating nonproductive interpersonal activities into 
a hidden action model of the relationship between a firm and workers. The existence of such 
socializing activities in fact has important effects on workers' effort incentives and the optimal 
wage contracts. The results are summarized as follows. 
1. Workers under-socialize: They could have attained higher expected utilities by simultan-
eously increasing their socialization levels. 
2. In particular, this under-socialization result implies that, contrary to the standard agency 
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relationship, the finn cannot attain the first-best outcome under the relationship with 
risk-neutral workers when social relations among workers exist. 
3. Allowing social relations among workers has better incentive effects than the policy of 
forcing workers not to socialize at all (isolation) if they are not of socializing type (the 
disutility of each worker is nondecreasing in his socialization level). 
4. Under the condition that workers, when working hard, have little incentive to socialize, 
the fmn prefers isolation to no control if there is a worker of socializing type. 
5. Under the same condition as in 4, isolation is preferred by the fmn if each worker with no 
social pleasure selects his socialization after observing how hard his co--worker works. 
6. Isolation may be adopted by the firm even in the situation where workers, when working 
hard, have incentives to socialize, because socializing activities may create another 
equilibrium effort pair preferred by both workers to the one finn wishes to implement. 
7. Workers who select their socializing activities to maximize their total welfare enjoy 
receiving higher socialization while their socialization levels are too high from the finn's 
standpoints. Thus, the incentive effect of collusive choice is ambiguous, and the finn does 
not necessarily prefer worker collusion unless workers are risk neutral. 
The current paper focused on one facet of social relations, that is, interpersonal actions 
which change co-workers' preferences directly. However, there are more subtle, indirect 
relations as well. Workers are very often influenced by observing the way co-workers are 
rewarded, how they behave, whether they are treated in a fair manner, and so on. There is a set 
of economic literature analyzing the interaction of workers in the finn by assuming that they 
have exogenously specified interdependent preferences (Akerlof, 1982; Frank, 1984). I think, 
however, that such social comparison is also at workers' discretion as socializing activities in our 
model are. By endogenizing the comparison processes, we may be able to examine how the finn 
affects workers' social comparison, and obtain some implications on its personnel systems. In 
fact, sociologists such as Baron (1988) and Perrow (1986) suggest the importance of endogeni-
zing workers' interpersonal preferences and summarize conditions favoring social comparison or 
those favoring individualistic behavior. 
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